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LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN’S COMPARATIVE LAW
Tom Ginsburg
Forthcoming in LAW, SOCIETY AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE LEGAL
HISTORY AND LEGAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAWRENCE M. Friedman, edited by Robert Gordon
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010).
For over four decades, Lawrence Friedman has been one of the key figures in
American law and society studies, as well as the country’s leading legal historian. His
unique vantage point has brought him into contact with a wide range of subfields in legal
studies, including, not least, comparative law. Friedman has never published in the
leading journals of the discipline, and he has had only peripheral involvement in the
multi-jurisdictional collaborative projects around which comparative lawyers have
organized much of their work. He does not write about foreign countries. Yet
Friedman’s series of book chapters and articles commenting on the field of comparative
law have articulated a consistent and important methodological challenge to the
mainstream of the field.
This essay elaborates Friedman’s comparative jurisprudence and argues that
comparative law since the 1960s would have been much more fruitful had it followed
Friedman’s advice. Friedman’s persistent mantra, more often ignored than heeded, has
been that comparative law must integrate with law and society studies. This stance has
been rooted in his strong claim that law is not autonomous of other elements of the social
system. Only in recent years has the discipline of comparative law begun to come around
to Friedman’s critique. We have lost four decades by ignoring Friedman.
I. Friedman on Law and Development
Friedman and the other grand figures of the Law and Society movement came of
age as scholars in an era, like our own, of optimism about the possibility of transferring
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legal institutions across borders. Informed by modernization theory, many were engaged
in the project of intentional legal transfers that became known as the Law and
Development movement (Tamanaha 1995). Funded by private American foundations
and the U.S. government, and supported by law schools, this movement famously sought
to transfer skills, institutions and ideas from the developed world to the developing world.
Leading law schools like Stanford and Yale became major centers of this activity.
The Law and Development movement ended by the mid-1970s with a sense of
frustration, crisis, and “self-estrangement,” as the leading epitaph on the movement put it
(Galanter and Trubek 1974). Reading back on the early writings of the most
sophisticated scholars in the field, including Friedman and Galanter, it seems clear that
they recognized early on that the funders’ hopes of legal-institutional transformation were
naïve. In their view, law was an inherently local technology despite its purported claims
to universality. These sociologically informed scholars suggested that efforts to transfer
formal law onto very different informal environments would be unsuccessful, and
possibly even counterproductive (Galanter 1966). The scholars’ own concerns were
analytic and positivist rather than technocratic in nature, seeking to understand the
process of social and legal change more than contributing to it. Thus the Law and
Society movement and the Law and Development movement shared a common
genealogy, and the experience of unmet expectations in the third world no doubt
informed the subsequent orientation of many of the major figures in Law and Society
studies.
Friedman’s position in this milieu, it seems to me, was as a respondent whose role
was to keep the others honest and to frame interesting questions, rather than to answer
them himself. He did not engage directly in studies of the developing nations; nor did he
did tour the world selling the American model of legal education. His role, instead, was
to critically read the works of those who did tour the world as well as those who sought to
develop positive theories of law and social change. Friedman’s role has been one of
external sounding board, problematizing the frameworks of others.
Consider the contrast with figures such as Galanter and Trubek, who traversed
some of the theoretical terrain covered by Weber and other modernists (Galanter 1966;
Trubek 1972). Both sought to develop frameworks for understanding modern law that
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involved wrestling with rationality. In a long and particularly insightful essay called On
Legal Development (Friedman 1969), Friedman summarizes Galanter’s 1966 piece, The
Modernization of Law, which identifies eleven traits that characterize modern law. These
familiar traits, including predictability, a transactional character, and uniform and
universal application by professionals, are well and good, Friedman seems to say.
Friedman concludes his summary, though, with a crucial question which went to the core
of the law and development movement, namely, is modern law the cause or product of
development? In a typically pointed analogy, he notes that “countries with high per
capita incomes also rank high in the number of neckties worn, low in loin clothes and
robes. Yet no one could modernize a country by changing its clothes.” Friedman thus
suggests that the frameworks that purport to analyze modern law are essentially
descriptive in character, catalogues or collections of attributes, rather than causal
accounts or analyses of the relationships among various attributes.
This point made in 1969 has continuing relevance today, for we are again in an
era of optimism regarding intentional legal transfers. “Law reform” is again in the
mouths of international development agencies, human rights groups, and ministries of
justice. And in re-reading Friedman’s work one has the feeling of déjà vu all over again,
wondering what lessons have been drawn from the field. We still know very little about
the interactions among various legal reforms, issues of timing and sequencing, and the
broad issue of causality (Stromseth et al, 2006). The questions have not changed much in
35 years, and our answers aren’t much better either.
One persistent issue in the field is the question whether institutional transfers are
even possible. Comparative law has historically expended the bulk of its energy on
tracing the borrowings of legal institutions across borders. The Law and Development
movements, of course, concerned a subset of these borrowings, namely ones that are
more or less consciously intended. And whether or not these can work has been a
controversial question; answers range from the technocratic view that law can move
easily and intentionally, to the radical culturalist position that legal transfers are a
contradiction in terms, and that cultural specificity of the recipient system inexorably
transforms the borrowed institution (Legrand 1997; Legrand 2001). A transplant, for
these post-modernist scholars, is a logical impossibility.

3

Where does Friedman come down on the efficacy of legal transfers? We can best
characterize him as a qualified optimist. He frames the question of transferability of law
in terms of two competing paradigms. On the one hand, there is a technological view of
law which sees it as universal, like an appendectomy procedure; this view suggests that
law involves the same process whether undertaken in California or Kyoto (Friedman
1978: 29). Presumably this means that law can be easily transferred across borders. On
the other hand, there is a long tradition of seeing law as culturally specific (Friedman
1978). Friedman’s view is that the question of transferability-nontransferability is too
general (1978: 30-31). Transferability is an empirical and sociological question, rather
than a conceptual or theoretical one. While we do have famous examples of legal
transplants such as the Turkish adaptation of Swiss law and the legal modernization of
Meiji Japan, there is a larger number of stories of failed transfers. Some features of law
are likely to be more transplantable than others, and the key question is what might be
called the cultural embeddedness of the area of law. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis is that
banking law ought to be more amenable to transfer across border than family law
(Friedman 1969. Bankers are businessmen responding to relatively universal profit
incentives embedded in markets, and banking transactions do not touch on core issues of
private or personal behavior. Family law, on the other hand, regulates non-elective
choices that are more or less permanent and difficult to exit. It touches on deep questions
of religion, culture and expectation. So legal transfers are less likely to take in recipient
societies.
Note how this position actually constitutes a hypothesis, amenable in principle to
empirical disconfirmation. Are rules that regulate economic behavior more easily
transferred than those regulating intimate or personal behavior? Most of us would
assume the answer is yes, but one could learn more through careful empirical study.
Very few have tried to do so (see e.g. Levmore 1986), and Friedman himself did not. His
own contributions in this field were conceptual rather than empirical.
Friedman’s ability to probe the intellectual underpinnings behind legal inquiry has
made him a respondent of choice for many conference organizers in comparative law. To
provide only one example of his technique, he was asked to participate in Cappelletti’s
(1978) high profile project on access to justice. Friedman argued that access to justice
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only becomes an issue when one accepts the peculiarly modern notion “that there is, or
ought to be, a single, uniform, universal body of norms; that every citizen—every man,
woman, and child—regardless of rank, social status or income must be able to enjoy the
protection and the privileges of that body of norms.” Most law, in most times and places,
has been hierarchical, and thus there is little demand for “access” until a liberal regime
starts to take hold. This move turned the focus back onto the intellectual questions
underlying the comparative law inquiry, away from technocratic concerns.
Friedman’s questioning stance led him to reflexive consideration not only about
the role of law in development, but about the reasons we are interested in law and
development. To make this point in 1969, as he did, was to foreshadow not only Trubek
and Galanter’s much more famous 1974 article, but also the whole turn to discursive and
critical analysis in legal studies.
II. Method in Comparative Law: Critiques
Here we can pivot the discussion away from law and development to broader
questions of method in comparative law. Friedman’s most sustained critique of
traditional comparative law has been methodological. Inasmuch as it possesses a
consistent methodology, traditional comparative law uses two techniques: comparative
doctrinal analysis and system-level taxonomy. Doctrinal focus takes law as an object and
examines the relationship between doctrinal developments in different countries, tracing
the transfer and spread of specific rules. Taxonomy involves categorizing legal systems
according to some dominant characteristic (Mattei 1997). The approach originates in a
scientistic approach to the study of comparative law that was dominant from the time of
Montesquieu until the early part of this century, classifying legal systems according to
their genetic characteristics (Marfording 1997). It is echoed today in the so-called “Law
and Finance” literature which postulates long-term effects of legal origins (La Porta et al
1998).
Both doctrinal analysis and taxonomy are essentially historical in character, and it
may seem ironic that neither method is particularly appealing to an unquestioned giant in
legal history. Friedman parts ways from traditional comparative legal historians who
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focus on the genealogy of particular rules. In a 1990 paper in honor of John Merryman,
Friedman diagnoses the ills of comparative law as well as its strengths (Friedman 1990).
Comparative law, in his view, has done a good job of generating information on materials
that facilitate cross-border transactions. This is the doctrinal work identified above. In a
typically succinct analogy, Friedman characterizes comparative law as being preoccupied
with the problems of translation across cultures and the corresponding search for
functional equivalents. It thus “has the virtues and the faults of a dictionary. A dictionary
is an essential reference tool, but nobody can learn a foreign language, or grasp its
essential genius, from a dictionary alone. …The vital core of a language is not to be
found in the dictionary, but in the mouths of real people, using a language in their daily
lives.” Friedman then notes that understanding a legal system requires more than the
dictionary-like tools: “A living body of law is not a collection of doctrines, rules, terms
and phrases. It is not a dictionary but a culture, and it has to be approached as such”
(1990: 50) .
This stance has strong methodological implications. The traditional methods of
the comparativist, doctrinal analysis and taxonomy, both implicitly adopt a view of law
as highly autonomous. A rule can be divorced from its social context, “transferred”
across borders, and then compared; the aggregate of rules forms a legal “system” that
exists independent of its society. But Friedman rejects this view. The comparativist’s
idea of legal tradition, he notes, tracing the genealogy of legal rules, is a “fairly arid and
formalist affair, divorced from context and the living law” (1994: 20)
Taxonomy, which focuses on the aggregate of rules in a system, can fare no better
without a sociological approach. Taxonomy is an essentially genealogical exercise that
aggregates the doctrinal development of particular rules into grand statements about the
family to which a legal system belongs. For Friedman, one must begin the inquiry with
the functioning legal system rather than its historical basis. It takes a certain amount of
intellectual courage for a professional historian to reject the dominant historical method
in comparative law, and yet Friedman did so because it was the wrong kind of history.
One can summarize his stance in a series of propositions. First, law, however it
may be defined, is not an autonomous system. It is responsive to needs and demands
from society, culture, and the economy; but it is not identical to them. Law, Friedman
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suggests, is neither wholly autonomous in the sense of impervious to social changes, nor
a mere “mirror” of society (see also Tamanaha 2001). This leads to a strong antiformalism:
“Formal change, almost universally, has no power in itself to do more
than to act as a tool of strong social forces. Otherwise, we would have to
admit that legal words, concepts and propositions have an almost magical
power, in themselves, to mold the attitudes, first, of lawyers and judges,
then of masses of people and in the long run determine their behavior.
There have been many men who believe in such a theory of law—law
insulated from and independent of social forces. But it runs counter to the
idea which modern social science insists upon—that law is part of the
totality of culture; that the part is not master of the whole; that interests
and values, pressing in from outside or internalized by those inside the
system, make up the law.” (Friedman 1969)
Second, law is a culturally specific category whose scope varies across societies
(Friedman 1994). This point poses severe methodological challenges to the comparative
enterprise. In the late 1970s, Friedman described comparative sociology of law, he
described, is “weak, fledgling branch of legal scholarship”(Friedman 1978) and it is
doubtful whether the recent explosion in research in foreign-focused materials in the law
and society journals would lead him to a different conclusion today, as little of this work
is truly comparative in scope.
If law, lawyers, and legal systems are defined differently in different societies,
comparison may be impossible. Perhaps in response to the paucity of method in
traditional comparative law, a number of comparative law scholars have recently begun
to follow the interpretive turn in contemporary anthropology (Ainsworth 1996). This
approach contrasts the external study of social phenomena with efforts to capture the
internal understanding of social meaning. Scholars leading the revival of this perspective
now call for a new kind of comparative law focused on the diversity and uniqueness of
legal systems and legal cultures. By forcing legal phenomena into pre-existing and
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universal categories, it is claimed, the observer loses what is distinctive and meaningful
about particular practices. Understanding the meaning of the practices within their
cultural contexts is the goal of these comparativists.
All of this was anticipated by Friedman, with his emphasis on culture, but he
seems to resist grand postmodernist claims of incommensurability as well. Instead, he
moves out to survey the forest rather than the trees, and emphasizes surprising similarities
rather than particularistic differences. When grappling with Blankenburg’s contrast of
Dutch and German legal cultures, for example, Friedman (1998) questions whether they
are really that different at all. Both systems face many of the same social problems, and
share methods of attacking them. The problem clearly is one of degree. While it may be
difficult to develop a precise jurisprudential definition of law, it is possible to develop a
sociological one (Friedman 1969). And the fact that the borders may be fuzzy, that some
things may be difficult to place as within the realm of the legal, does not reduce the fact
that some things clearly are in the category of legal actors and legal behavior. The
method that this stance implies is, in short, a lot of reading and hard work. There are no
shortcuts other than knowing as much as one can about various societies and how law, as
a discrete mode of social ordering, operates in local culture.
Thus Friedman remains optimistic about positive social science. Annelise Riles,
in an important critical volume on comparative law as an intellectual discipline, (Riles
2001) notes that it is normative and modernist in character, seeking “unity through law”
and identifying the “common core” of legal systems.1 Friedman and collaborators made
similar points in the late 1970s (Merryman, Clark et al. 1979). 2 They noted that the
discipline of comparative law always sought universality, and was in this sense a logical
1
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social science to understand and grapple with national features.
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extension of continental notions of legal science. Friedman and his collaborators thus
identified the same problem that Riles did later, but pushed in the direction of positivist
inquiry rather than post-modernist self-reflection.

III. The Trope of Legal Culture
Once we move to the behavioral concept of law, comparing two societies is a
particularly difficult task. For Friedman, the key point of inquiry is his long-standing
trope of legal culture. Culture matters. As he put it in 1969:
“There do seem to be differences between legal systems which cannot be
explained as differences in their strictly legal inheritance, cannot be traced
to substantive and structural dissimilarities, and cannot be entirely imputed
to differences in technology or economy, yet are not purely formal
differences either. These differences reside in what we might call the
cultural domain. I would like to suggest that what separates modern from
premodern and nonmodern law is a critical cultural distinction.”
Friedman’s concept of legal culture has evolved over time. The quotation above
makes it sound like a residual category, composed of everything not easily explained by
other more observable factors. But he has in mind something more concrete. Legal
culture, in Friedman’s sense, is “values, opinions, attitudes and beliefs about law”
(Friedman 1998). It might include (and does include at various points in his corpus of
work) ideas about law, propensities to litigate, and customs and habits related to law.
Indeed, Cotterell (1997) attacks Friedman as including phenomena too diffuse to fit
within a single construct, and accuses Friedman of shifting the concept of culture over
time.
My reading of his use of culture is as an intervening variable. Social forces make
law, but social change does not produce legal change directly. Rather, legal culture
mediates similar pressures in different ways in different societies (Friedman 1994). Yet
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legal culture is not static, but partially responsive to social, technological and economic
change. For example, as the number and type of economic transactions increase in the
developing world, there may be some convergence in attitudes toward law with the
developed world. Culture thus represents a kind of lag, though it is hardly predictable in
the ways it changes. It is partly a constraint, but also partly a wild card, not capable of
mechanistic analysis.
The very notion of culture sounds like it emphasizes the particular and the
permanent. But Friedman makes the case that legal culture can be studied at a general
level: there is, a distinctively modern legal culture around which societies converge
(Friedman 1994). The modern legal culture, writes Friedman, shares six traits: 1) Rapid
legal change, in line with rapid social change; 2) Density and ubiquity of law, leading to a
juridification of social life; 3) Instrumental legitimacy of law as a tool of social
engineering; 4) a somewhat paradoxical emphasis on rights and entitlements; 5) a culture
of individualism, which explains the shift toward rights; and 6) Globalization and
convergence of legal cultures.
Here Friedman’s angle on globalization becomes apparent. Many argue that
globalized efforts to transfer legal institutions are imperialistic and involve crude
Westernization. But this claim implicitly assumes that the rule of law concept is
culturally specific to the west. Friedman argues that it is not so much Western as modern
(Friedman 1994). Modern societies are complex, and involve less face-to-face
interaction among people who know each other. They also involve disruption to
established social orders, as the adoption of formal equality undermines culturally rooted
hierarchies. Again, Friedman has a pithy analogy, likening the historical introduction of
modern law in the West to the automobile: “America was the first automobile society, but
it does not follow that the streets of Tokyo, Seoul and Bangkok are jammed with traffic
because of American influence” (Friedman 1998).
The simple observation that legal culture reflects underlying social forces allows
Friedman to emphasize surprising similarities that cut across the traditional “families” of
comparative law. Thus, he sees similarities between the legal cultures of Germany and
the Netherlands, Japan and the United States (Friedman 1998) and Belgium and Britain
(Friedman 1990). All of these systems face common problems of industrial societies:
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auto accidents, bond flotations, social security payments. On the other hand, observes
Friedman, a British lawyer transported backwards in time a century or two would find
himself quite unfamiliar with virtually everything about the law. Legal culture is
dynamic and responsive, not genetic. And this convincingly lays to rest the traditional
comparativists’ idea that legal families provide much analytic bite in understanding
contemporary societies.
This is a good illustration of the liberating power of the concept of legal culture in
social explanation. Ross (1993) notes that the “alluring ambiguity of legal culture offers
a standing invitation to arrange seemingly unconnected bits of the past in new and
revealing patterns without dampening enthusiasm or imagination by suggesting in
advance what should and should not matter . . . .” Indeed the very inclusiveness of the
concept “can prod historians to make unexpected connections and stimulate scholarly
inventiveness.” Friedman has indeed used it to this effect.
Even if one accepts this view of the utility and power of legal culture as a concept,
there is still the enormous evidentiary difficulty to overcome in deploying it. How can
one know what attitudes and ideas about law are? Studying living law is difficult and
expensive; indeed, one might say Friedman rejects incommensurability at the theoretical
level, only to recreate it at the practical level by utilizing the empirically challenging
construct of culture as his key analytic variable. Perhaps then, he means to utilize the
notion of culture as a kind of remonstrance for researchers. Simply because you can’t
easily observe it does not mean that culture isn’t there. So we should at least attempt to
read between the lines of what evidence we do have, be it legal documents or litigation
rates or judicial decisions, for what they tell us about the real issue of legal culture.
Better to focus on the difficult but crucial issues than to bypass them in favor of easier
work.
IV. On Big Theories and Small Cases
Friedman also has what I might call the historian’s distaste for grand theory.
Ideas produced by legal scholars about law and society no doubt have the potential to
shape the legal system. But Friedman’s view (1994: 1293) is that “great ideas have little
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or nothing to do with the way the legal system grinds away on a daily basis. …Great
ideas are distilled from simple, commonplace notions that are part of the fabric of daily
life.” This is itself, of course, a theoretical statement.
Friedman’s concern with bottom-up construction of the legal system, of the
details of law in ordinary lives, has led him to participate in a number of exercises in
gathering massive amounts of data (Kagan and al 1978; Merryman, Clark et al. 1979).
Yet one wishes, at times for more theoretical integration. The 1979 SLADE volume, for
example, contains rich time-series data on litigation rates, types of claims and legal
documents in a number of Mediterranean and Latin American jurisdictions. The
Introduction lays out a critique of law and development. But there is no attempt to
analyze the data, to do more. I can picture the other members of the group, putting
forward suggestions for data analysis, only to have Friedman expose in laser-like fashion
the conceptual weakness in their constructs.
It is not that Friedman thinks such analysis is impossible, for, as I hope I have
made clear, he believes firmly in the possibility of social science. He acknowledges that
some comparison is possible, just very difficult. But because of his view of culture as the
key phenomenon for analysis, he has, in a sense, avoided having to do the social science
work by placing all the weight on the most empirically difficult part of the legal system to
study. He has left that difficult work to the rest of us laboring in the trenches of
comparative law.
What then, might a Friedmanite comparative law look like? Clearly, it would
obviously be a branch of and technique for comparative social studies. Friedman’s essay
with Teubner (Friedman and Teubner 1986) calls for a shift in legal method “away from
doctrine, classification and abstraction, toward a problem-oriented, functional approach.”
Looking at the operation of law and legal rules in society must be the starting point.
Functionalism, of course, has a long tradition in comparative law. But in general
the social science invoked is implicit, not explicit. Classic comparativists (Zweigert and
Kotz 1998) recognize that different legal rules can play similar functions in different
societies. But they do not take the logical next step, which is to identify social, cultural
and environmental factors as the relevant independent variables worthy of inquiry.
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Friedman suggests that these are not only worthy of study, but essential to making any
progress.
One finds, then, suggestive hypotheses for empirical testing throughout
Friedman’s work. “In all societies people avoid activities that impose on them
punishments or costs and they perform acts that bring them rewards. What differs from
society to society is the perception of benefit or cost.” (Friedman 1969). This would
seem to suggest experimental and empirical projects to isolate the perceptions of costs
and benefits, integrating cross-cultural psychology with law and economics. (One might
think of this as Lawrence’s challenge to his namesake Milton). The statement also
suggests that legal systems are essentially frames or images of social reality. They are
epistemologies which guide and orient legal decision-makers. These perceptions of legal
decision-makers are clearly related to, yet autonomous from, the general perceptions of
society. As he and Teubner (1986) conclude: “The traditional approach to legal doctrine
is either dead, or at best ineffective in explaining how legal systems actually behave. The
social sciences may not have satisfactory answers; but at least they do sometimes ask the
right questions.”
Conclusion
For comparative lawyers, Friedman is a problematizer and wise critic. Indeed,
given the prescience of his articles in the late 1960s, one might even call him prophetic.
His consistent concern, too often ignored, has been to push comparative studies to the
issue of culture, and to how people understand the law. But he consistently rejects claims
of incommensurability and in this sense defends the possibility of comparative legal
studies.
The challenges to a Friedmanite comparative law are enormous since his
framework identifies as the key variable something very difficult to observe. Indeed, I
have suggested that at times his view leans toward a practical incommensurability at the
same time that he rejects a theoretical one. Yet we are beginning to see steps in the right
direction in comparative legal studies.3 Much comparative work now relies on very close
3

I hesitate to single out specific studies, but Ross 2004 and Whitman 2004 would likely
meet with Friedmanite approval.
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social science work to grapple with the law in action, taking culture seriously. But on
balance, comparative law and society studies have not come far since Friedman
developed his framework in the late 1960s. Had he put on a beret and developed a
complex multisyllabic vocabulary, we might think of Friedman as one of the great social
theorists of the 20th century. Instead, he had the simpler virtue of simply asking the right
questions, early and often.
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